

Session 21-03, a Regular Meeting of the Public Works Campus Task Force was called to order by Chair Donna Aderhold at 2:31 p.m. on March 10, 2021 via Zoom Webinar from the City Hall Conference Room located at 491 E. Pioneer Avenue, Homer, Alaska.

PRESENT: JULIE ENGBRETSSEN, JACOB ARGUETA, JAN KEISER, LARRY SLONE, CHARLES BARNWELL, CAROLINE VENUTI AND DONNA ADERHOLD

STAFF: RENEE KRAUSE, DEPUTY CITY CLERK

AGENDA APPROVAL

Chair Aderhold requested a motion to approve the agenda.

SLONE/KEISER MOVED TO APPROVE THE AGENDA.

There was no discussion.

VOTE. NON-OBJECTION. UNANIMOUS CONSENT.

Motion carried.

PUBLIC COMMENTS UPON MATTERS ALREADY ON THE AGENDA

APPROVAL OF MINUTES

A. Regular Meeting Minutes for February 24, 2021

Chair Aderhold requested a motion to approve the minutes.

SLONE/VENUTI MOVED TO APPROVE THE MINUTES AS PRESENTED

There was no discussion.

VOTE. NON-OBJECTION. UNANIMOUS CONSENT.

Motion carried.

VISITORS/PRESENTATIONS

REPORTS

PENDING BUSINESS

A. Memorandum from Member Engebretsen re: Risk Catalogue and Evaluation

Chair Aderhold introduced the item by reading of the title and invited Ms. Engebretsen to present her memorandum.

Member Engebretsen reported that Member Barnwell had provided some maps and Member Slone had presented some questions that were distributed by the Clerk and she would like to address those items before launching into the exercise of cataloguing the risks.

Member Barnwell reviewed the maps which indicated the following:

- various contours at 6 foot which provide the key elevation interval that were discussed during the presentation at the last meeting.
- the Public Works Campus in relationship to the maximum inundation at 36 feet, according to DGGs worst case scenario
- Scenarios depicted in the Inundation Report relative to the contour lines vary due to the different factors used in the computer modeling for the scenarios
- He supported the science used to depict the scenarios, which were vetted by various organizations to include FEMA
- Using the information in the report it is recommended that you go above the maximum inundation by 20-30% which is 7-10 feet.
- Using the GIS information provided, relative to the LIDAR data and the potential sites will prove our due diligence and it will just require the completion of the report and Council final decision.
- Frame of reference is the Mean Highest High Water is from DGGs
- GIS data can be looked at directly
- The full inundation of the Public Works Campus is 24 feet and the southern boundary would be reached at 18 feet
- Accuracy of LIDAR is 3 cm vertical and 2cm horizontal which is very high resolution data and is tightly monitored and controlled. The LIDAR data is calibrated against the flight data, the information was vetted since 2019 and was not released until 2020.
- The information was a great base for engineering and planning.
- There is a big difference in comparing evacuation planning versus building placement

Member Slone posed the following questions and or comments:

- Possible to receive additional info about earthquake event probabilities, perhaps in the form of a graph or matrix. This would be helpful on determining the potential risks to Public Works from a worst-case scenario that we discussed at the worksession, risks that Julie is refining for our next meeting.
- The information would list the generally accepted numbers for energy released for each magnitude between, 7.0 to a 9.2 earthquake. It would also list the frequency of occurrence. Example: Barrett Salisbury stated in the presentation that a M7.0 earthquake was 30 times less powerful but ten times more likely than a M8.0.
- once the actual elevation of Public Works is determined above MHHW (Mean Highest High Water) then we can work on determining what Tsunami level (Magnitude 7.0 or 8.0, for example, the other factors – depth of earthquake, slip-joint – remaining the same) constitutes a break-even point, above which Public Works would be vulnerable, but below which no threat would be posed.

- There are three factors, earthquake Magnitude is the dominant factor to us because it appears to be the one element most commonly used in discussions about Tsunami risk.

A brief discussion ensued on the following topics:

- Mean Highest High Water line that would reach but not flood the Public Works Facility is 18 feet while any water over 24 feet would flood the facility
- Current LIDAR data takes into account the Mean High Water line and it is the best data to in terms of topography
- LIDAR data accuracy
- Report and data was fully vetted by FEMA, USGS
- Recommendation from DGGs buffer is 20-30% beyond the maximum inundation line which amounts to 7-10 feet
- Reviewing evacuation routes is a different planning need

Member Engebretsen provided information regarding evacuation routes and community brochure and future work on that topic.

Member Slone stated that he is looking for additional information to figure reasonable probabilities and believes that it would provide a basis to enable their review.

Data presentation last meeting that every step, in other words like from seven to eight magnitude increases. The energy by 3232 32 times. But it's also only one 10th is likely.

Member Slone presented concerns regarding probability and believes that the Task Force requires additional information regarding probability before they can catalog the risks and recommend how to mitigate them as well.

Member Engebretsen suggested that Member Keiser contact Ms. Suleimani or Mr. Salisbury on the technical questions regarding probability and translate that technical information so the lay person can understand it.

There was brief dialogue on information provided in the All Hazard Mitigation document on page 31 regarding seismicity, earthquakes and probability of risk and getting further clarification on that information so that they can fully discern the various scenarios and probability of the Public Works Facility being inundated. A point made during discussion was that the likelihood may be low but if it does happen it will be catastrophic and believe that has relevancy and import to the determination.

Further discussion on the following items ensued:

- Translating this information so that it can be understood by the general public
- Possibility of minor event causing major damage
- Updating evacuation routes and emergency plans to reflect new information
- Homer first Tsunami and storm ready community
- The information in the report was intended for use in planning development and emergency response
- The damage cause by the earthquake in Japan in 2011

- Information is relevant to community planning and that is what this action is actually performing with the Public Works Building and if the City is going to use this red line or blue for designating evacuation routes and safe zones then the City needs to fund for the future
- There is limited ability to forecast earthquakes and any resulting tsunamis, the science is good but not exacting, there is not enough data available
- This action will assist the Community understand the importance of the issues such as human life, materials, equipment and overall impacts

Member Engebretsen facilitated an exercise in reviewing and rating the level of impact to the community with regard to the following:

Materials –

Calcium Chloride Storage – Quantity – unknown - Value of Materials – Approximately \$10,000

Fuel Island – Quantity would be nice since that would need to be mitigated - Value of Fuel

Member Keiser will provide those numbers for the next meeting.

Member Slone stated that he had a conversation with Member Keiser and noted that while the material is consumed and when it comes to replacement it could be stored at another location, but that then brings the question of security that would be needed at a new location. This may take a few years. He then noted that they could check the requirements from the EPA for the Fuel Depot but maybe they could place a berm around the Public Works facility.

Chair Aderhold recommended that they include what the risk actually is such as the damage that calcium chloride does to the environment.

Member Engebretsen stated that is where she needs input and information from the scientists on the Task Force. She then reviewed the Workers Section noting that Administrative Staff, Mechanics, etc. would lose their place to work some may be able to work from home but others would require another location. This would require immediate relocation which would be difficult. The difficult part is determining the threat to life that is credible.

Member Slone noted that it is difficult to determine and the time that there is before the facility would be flooded would allow an able bodied person to get to safety, but knowing who is onsite at all times and being able to deal with a possible medical event and need for assistance to remove that person or persons.

Member Keiser agreed that in the best situation the loss of life may be a minimal risk but described the possible scenario of the greater potential to life with the current practice of everyone heading into the facility to remove all rolling equipment, the police coming in to fuel their vehicles, traffic conflicts, and just the general confusion.

Further comments on the topic of workers and fueling were offered as followed:

- Relocating fuel depot to the old police station
- Alternate fuel source or storage
- Traffic control during evacuation of rolling stock interacting with evacuating persons
- Lack of materials, tools to effect recovery from an incident

- Current equipment evacuation process does not impact too much on residential or visitor evacuation from the Spit
- Depending on the severity of the earthquake would affect the probability of tsunami and thus require the evacuation of Public Works
- What would Public Works Employees be able to do if they did not have perform the evacuation of Public Works assist other departments such as Police with notifications, Port and Harbor in relocating their equipment.
- There is no current plan other than remove and relocate the equipment
- Some mechanical services could be hired out, but most are specialized services and tools (equipment) so there would be difficulty in maintaining equipment
- Replacement of lost equipment, tools, etc. for administrative personnel as well as mechanics, parks, etc.
- Flood Insurance costs mentioned in the All Hazard Mitigation plan is for residential and Flood insurance does not cover tsunami waters
- It is not reasonable or feasible to contract out heavy equipment repair or maintenance or to create a vital tools/equipment list since there are multiple permutations of the possible list
- Movement of the Sewer Treatment Plant is not feasible due to the cost involved, possible mitigation of any environmental harm from the inundation, impact of tsunami wave to the structure may be minimal or repairable.
- Loss of historical files related to projects and subdivisions (drawings), mitigation efforts can be accomplished by making the drawings electronic or placing these documents in storage facility.
- Radio and Communications systems loss would be detrimental to the control of PRV systems which is part of the water system and the lift stations; loss of communication system capacity affects emergency response for the city.
- Bulk Water Use in winter or summer

Comments and discussions on equipment covered the following:

- Current mitigation plans does not cover all rolling stock especially the equipment that is on a trailer, in for repair or disabled up to 20-25%, hard to maneuver such as the asphalt machine; dependent on the weather materials and supplies are mostly protected there may be some piping or culverts
- All parks related equipment would not be moved including signage
- Loss of sand or gravel would impact repairs and maintenance of city roads and water service
- Motor Pool – other department rolling stock in maintained and repaired by PW
- Security and Vandalism issues if equipment and supplies are relocated to another location, currently the existing location is not in general view and there are personnel in the Public Works facility 24 hours a day
- Relocate all rolling equipment to Hazel Avenue but for long term storage mitigation equipment could be relocated to the HERC or Library parking lot.

Member Slone questioned the existing continuing operations plan for Public Works in the event of a tsunami.

Public Works Director Keiser responded that currently Public Works does not have one that would be effective and are working on it now which is what triggered the request for this Task Force to be created.

Additional discussion ensued with points made on the extent of Emergency Operations Planning by Departments and touching on that within the catalogue but for the most part that is beyond the scope of this task force.

Chair Aderhold inquired about adding the technology and administrative office computer equipment.

Member Engebretsen noted that due to COVID the technology part would be simple to mitigate but the loss of phones and office space is what would be hard to mitigate.

NEW BUSINESS

A. Next Steps

Member Engebretsen will refine and update the chart for the next meeting.

Member Keiser will be contacting Elena Suleimani regarding probability

Member Argueta will look into the toxicity to the environment for the fuel and calcium chloride and other additional chemicals that are located at Public Works.

A brief discussion ensued on the ability to have information for the worksession available and if they can cancel the worksession since the packet would need to be ready on Friday. It was noted that there was a typographical error on the date in the packet.

VENUTI/KEISER - MOVED TO CANCEL THE WORKSESSION ON MARCH 17, 2021 AND HAVE ALL RESEARCH AVAILABLE FOR THE MARCH 24, 2021 REGULAR MEETING.

There was a brief discussion.

VOTE. NON-OBJECTION. UNANIMOUS CONSENT.

Motion carried.

Chair Aderhold requested any additional items that they should address for the next meeting.

Deputy City Clerk asked about the insurance coverage information.

Chair Aderhold recommended that if any member thought of an item for the agenda to let the Clerk know and she will get it on the agenda.

INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS

COMMENTS OF THE AUDIENCE

COMMENTS OF THE CITY STAFF

Deputy City Clerk Krause commented on the retention of historical records retention and the intent of the City Clerk's Office implementing a City Wide Records Management System.

COMMENTS OF THE TASK FORCE

Ms. Venuti commented on learning some interesting facts regarding earthquake and tsunami that they are happening everywhere. It was interesting meeting. Have a good weekend.

Ms. Engebretsen thanked everyone for their time and attention.

Ms. Keiser commented on a remark made at the recent Council meeting by Councilmember Smith about having the meetings in the evenings since the meetings are conducted in the afternoon it does not allow for public participation.

Chair Aderhold requested Deputy City Clerk to contact Councilmember Smith regarding his concerns.

Mr. Barnwell commented on the questions from the Planning Commission regarding the work they are doing and believes there should be some more public involvement.

Chair Aderhold commented that once they have progressed a bit further that they can schedule some public engagement associated with the project for solicitation of public input.

ADJOURNMENT

There being no further business to come before the Task Force the meeting adjourned at 4:26 p.m. The next regular meeting is scheduled for Wednesday, March 24, 2021 at 2:30 p.m. at the City Hall Cowles Council Chambers via Zoom Webinar located at 491 E. Pioneer Avenue, Homer, Alaska.

RENEE KRAUSE, MMC, DEPUTY CITY CLERK

Approved: _____